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1. InTRoduCTIon
Agency theory defines the agency relationship where 
the principal (or owner) delegates tasks to an agent 
(or manager). The theory highlights costs associated 
with the principal–agent relationship, which include 
the opportunistic behaviour or self-interest of the 
agent taking priority over the principal’s interest. 
Mallin (2004) highlighted a number of dimensions 
to this including the agent misusing their power for 
financial or other advantage; and the agent not taking 
appropriate risks in pursuance of the principal’s 
interests—often because managers are more risk-averse 
than the companies they lead. Another cost arises due 
to the principal and agent having access to different 
levels of information; the agent (manager) usually being 
in control of superior and more detailed information 
than that of the owner (information asymmetry). This 
requires the owner to institute expensive monitoring 
of the manager’s actions to redress the knowledge 
imbalance.
Fama (1980) argued that the boards of directors 
provide the most critical, internally based method 
for monitoring the performance of managers. They 
have the ability to directly oversee the performance 
of managers and to offer incentives to managers that 
reward performance in line with owner expectations; 
or, equally, discipline managers when these are not met. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) note that effective monitoring 
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requires the board of directors to act as an independent 
arbiter between management and owners, as collusion 
could result in an overall loss to the owners. To assess 
the degree to which a board may act independently to 
monitor the performance of managers, a number of key 
measures of board independence have been studied. 
These include the size and structure of the board, with 
the former referring to the number of directors; and the 
latter generally being the proportion of non-executives, 
the number of sub-committees, the proportion of 
non-executives on sub-committees and whether the 
CEo and chairperson positions are combined. If 
monitoring is effective, a positive relationship should 
exist between the level of board independence and firm 
performance (Mura 2007; Choi, Park & Yoo 2007; 
Schmid & Zimmermann 2008).
There has been heightened interest in key 
corporate governance mechanisms following the 
collapse of Harris Scarfe ltd and HIH Insurance in 
Australia, and Enron and WorldCom in the united 
States (uS). As stated by the Cadbury Committee 
(1992), strong governance involves balancing corporate 
performance with an appropriate level of monitoring. 
one aspect has been a strong emphasis on the 
internal elements of governance and, in particular, 
sub-committees and the roles of non-executive and 
independent directors. numerous recommendations 
immediately following the collapse of Enron and 
WorldCom (e.g. the Smith Report 2003) have focused 
on the independence of committee members as a 
significant component of strong corporate governance.
There has been little research done on board-
monitoring sub-committees, particularly the existence 
of them and their independence (Gales & Kesner 1994; 
dalton et al. 1998). This study extends the work of 
previous researchers to include the number of board 
sub-committees established by the main board as well 
as their composition as part of the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms that potentially affect firm 
performance.
The present study investigates the monitoring 
of company management by an independent board 
of directors and should be of practical interest to 
regulators, accounting bodies and standard setters. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
The next section provides an overview of the literature 
of relevance to board independence and performance 
in Australia and internationally. The hypotheses are 
developed in the third section. The fourth section 
provides information on critical control variables, 
after which there is a discussion of the research design 
and sample selection. The sixth section examines the 
results obtained; and this is followed by the concluding 
section, looking at the findings’ implications and some 
directions for further research.
2. BACKGRound
Empirical studies have been undertaken to assess 
the degree to which the independence of the board 
(as reflected in the above characteristics) impacts on 
company performance. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 
assessed whether share prices respond positively 
when additional outside directors are appointed to 
companies. They found a statistically significant, but 
economically small effect on prices averaging around 
0.2%. They found this effect to be slightly stronger 
when the appointment is for a director representing 
a financial institution versus those in other business. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt’s (1997) study focused on the 
price effect of the appointment of insiders (managers) 
to the board. They reported associated stock price 
decreases, although these were only significant when 
an insider is added to the board of a company where 
inside directors own a significant proportion (5–25%) 
of the shares.
Consistent with the above study, Klein 
(1998) found only a modest association between 
firm performance and overall board composition, 
with directors divided into insiders, outsiders and 
affiliates. She did, however, isolate significant positive 
relationships between the percentage of executive 
directors on finance and investment sub-committees, 
and both accounting and market performance 
measures. Additionally, weak evidence is provided of 
a positive relation between firm performance and the 
presence of at least one outside director holding at least 
5% of the firm’s equity. 
Fich (2005) analysed 1,493 first-time director 
appointments to Fortune 1000 boards, for the period 
1997–99, to assess whether certain outside directors 
produce more positive share price reactions. The 
study found that appointees who are CEos of other 
companies result in a more positive share price reaction 
than for other appointments. In addition, the study 
revealed positive long-term performance benefits 
in firms that appoint outside CEos as directors. 
The study found, however, that CEos experienced 
negative stock-price effects at their own firms when 
they accepted outside director positions and this was 
particularly pronounced if the CEo’s own firm was 
faced with significant growth opportunities.
Mura (2007) also examined the relationship 
between firm performance and board composition. 
The results, which included a test for endogeneity 
among variables, confirmed that the direction of 
the relationship moves from board composition to 
performance. A significant positive coefficient on the 
variable of the proportion of outside directors showed 
that the proportion of non-executives on the board 
has a positive impact on firm performance. The study 
3
Asia Pacific Journal of Economics & Business (2011) 15.2: 1–15
supported the idea that non-executive directors are 
effective monitors of the firms’ management for this 
united Kingdom (uK)-based sample.
The level of outsider representation on the sub-
committees of the main board has also been associated 
with the independence of the board and reduced 
agency costs. For example, in Australia Bosch (1995) 
proposed that audit committees should comprise a 
majority of non-executive directors. Stapledon and 
lawrence (1997) concluded in a study of the top 100 
Australian companies that independent directors 
are better placed to monitor executive management 
effectively. Vance (1983) drew a similar conclusion 
in believing that the independence of such directors 
ensures both objectivity and sufficient means of ‘checks 
and balances’ in relation to managerial behaviour. 
Menon and Williams (1994: 125) similarly stated 
that the presence of executive managers on an audit 
committee precludes them from being an objective 
monitor of management. Finally, Cotter and Silvester 
(2003: 214) reported that ‘…independent audit 
committees can reduce agency costs by minimizing 
the opportunistic selection of financial accounting 
policies, and by increasing the credibility and accuracy 
of financial reporting’.
The independence of remuneration committees 
that determine the reward packages for senior 
executives is also considered essential (Bosch 1995). 
Kesner (1988) believed this determination to be central 
to the monitoring role of the board as it evaluates the 
performance of the managers in line with company 
goals and sets appropriate rewards for performance. 
Cotter and Silvester (2003) noted that an independent 
committee is far more likely to determine a fair and 
equitable reward package, thereby reducing agency 
costs, than if executives are responsible for setting 
their own pay.
laing and Weir (1999) studied the relationship 
between the governance structures proposed by 
the Cadbury Committee (1992) and corporate 
performance in the uK. The sample consisted of 115 
quoted, non-financial uK companies for the years 
1992 and 1995. The study found a positive impact 
of board sub-committees on performance (measured 
as return on assets) in both years. Companies with 
remuneration and audit committees outperformed 
others. Additional evidence from the study showed a 
significant improvement in performance for those firms 
that introduced audit and remuneration committees 
during the periods under examination, suggesting that 
the establishment of board committees is an effective 
monitoring mechanism. A further study by Weir and 
laing (2000) found the presence of a remuneration 
committee has a positive effect on performance as 
measured by market returns but not on the accounting 
performance. Similarly, the return on assets is lower 
if firms have more outside directors on the board, but 
this is not reflected in the market returns. 
The independence of the board is also considered 
in the context of the leadership structure in operation; 
that is, are the roles of CEo and chair combined or 
separated? The empirical evidence on this question is 
limited, but generally favours that a separation of roles 
leads to improved performance. An empirical study 
by Rechner and dalton (1991) found that companies 
with separated roles outperform firms with combined 
roles. They assessed that their findings ‘…may 
provide empirical support for some strongly-worded 
admonitions about a governance structure that includes 
the same individual serving simultaneously as CEo 
and board chairperson’ (p. 59). 
Pi and Timme (1993) produced similar results 
in a sample of banks over the 1987–90 period. Their 
study, which included controls for firm size and 
other variables, determined that the accounting-based 
measure (return on assets) was higher for firms with 
separated roles. Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) used 
a market-based measure (market value added) to 
determine similarly that a dual leadership structure 
produced superior returns in the long run.
Elsayed (2007) examined the extent to which 
board leadership structure (as proxied by CEo duality) 
impacts corporate performance in Egyptian-listed 
companies. Two alternative measures of corporate 
performance were used: return on assets and return to 
shareholder ratio. The sample was taken from Egyptian 
public limited firms over the period 2000–04. The data 
on board leadership structure, corporate performance 
and other related variables were available for ninety-
two firms in nineteen different industrial sectors. 
The findings initially indicated that board leadership 
structure has no direct impact on corporate performance. 
Additional analysis, however, revealed that the impact 
of CEo duality on corporate performance varied with 
financial performance of firms and across industry types. 
Consistent with the finding of Finkelstein and d’Aveni 
(1994), CEo duality is preferable in low-performance 
firms. overall, the findings support the conclusion of the 
meta-analysis of Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy 
(2001), and the argument of Boyd (1995) and Brickley, 
Coles and Jarrell (1997); in that the relationship between 
board leadership structure and corporate performance 
may vary within the context of firms and industry, and 
that CEo duality will only be advantageous for some 
firms whilst not for others.
Board sub-committees were investigated by 
Weir, laing and McKnight (2002) using 311 quoted, 
non-financial uK firms covering the period 1994–96. 
They found little evidence that board structure affects 
performance. Their results also indicated that the 
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structure and quality of board sub-committees have 
little impact on performance—a finding consistent 
with Klein (1998), Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and 
dalton et al. (1998). Weir, laing and McKnight’s 
(2002) study, however, found that companies in the 
top performance deciles have a greater proportion of 
independent directors both on their boards and on 
their audit committees.
The literature on governance characteristics 
and performance is still developing, particularly in 
its application to countries outside the uS and uK. 
Generally, public policy has preceded in advance 
of rigorous empirical research findings, with many 
countries imposing regulation or codes of conduct 
upon companies. These have usually been based on 
the assumption that an independent board is in the 
best interest of shareholders, although the literature 
provides only modest support for this view. 
3. HYPoTHESIS dEVEloPMEnT
Agency theory suggests the use of effective corporate 
governance mechanisms to mitigate manager–
shareholder conflicts and to monitor the performance 
of managers. Hypotheses relating to effective corporate 
governance mechanisms are developed under four 
main categories: the proportion of independent 
directors who form part of the board; the leadership 
structure of the CEo and chairperson; the existence 
and independence of various board sub-committees; 
and, the shareholding of executive and independent 
directors. The role of external auditors as an additional 
means of monitoring managerial behaviour is also 
examined in the study.
3.1 Proportion of Independent directors
national corporate governance codes of conduct 
generally focus on how boards of directors should be 
structured in order to generate independent control 
of companies. Most often they prescribe a minimum 
representation of non-executive directors as a means 
of achieving sufficient independence from management 
(Bosch 1995; nACd 1996; Holmstrom & Kaplan 
2003). non-executive directors are believed to play an 
important role in monitoring, and perhaps challenging 
if needed, management. This is supported in agency 
theory, which suggests that effective monitoring leads 
to a reduction in agency costs since managers have 
fewer opportunities to build their personal wealth at 
the expense of shareholders. 
despite the above, empirical evidence on the 
value of non-executive directors on boards is mixed. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) showed that a positive 
stock price reaction follows the appointment of non-
executive directors to company boards. Weir, laing 
and McKnight (2002) found that the presence of non-
executive directors on uK boards positively influenced 
the return to shareholder ratio of companies. using 
a large panel dataset of uK firms for the period 
1991–2001, Mura (2007) found significant positive 
association between the proportional representation 
of non-executives on the board and firm performance. 
Similarly, Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) reported that 
outside directors in Korea have a significant and 
positive effect on firm performance. 
In contrast, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Mehran (1995), Klein (1998), dalton et al. (1998), Vafeas 
and Theodorou (1998) and laing and Weir (1999) all 
found no significant performance relationship; a possible 
explanation being that boards dominated by outsiders 
may lack company-specific operational knowledge to 
effectively guide the company (Klein 1998). 
on balance, it is expected that a majority outsider 
representation best enables efficient monitoring 
activities, leading to a fall in agency costs. To investigate 
this relationship further, this study examines the 
relationship between board composition and firm 
performance as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of independent 
directors serving on the board will be positively 
associated with improved monitoring of management 
and, consequently, higher firm performance.
3.2 CEo duality
A question that has received growing attention in 
corporate governance literature is whether there is a 
relationship between board leadership structure and 
corporate performance. It is often speculated that 
the presence of a combined CEo/chair compromises 
the independence of the board as the individual has 
sufficient power to unreasonably influence company 
decision-making (Cadbury Committee 1992; Jensen 
1993) and, thereby, reduce the board’s ability both 
to monitor and discipline the management team. 
When the CEo is also the board chairperson, a single 
person holding both roles is more likely to dominate 
the board, as it ‘…signals the absence of separation of 
the decision management and the decision controls’ 
(Fama & Jensen 1983: 314). This could render the 
board ineffective in discharging its leadership and 
control duties (daily & dalton 1993; Jensen 1993), 
with CEos free ‘…to pursue their own interests rather 
than the interests of shareholders’ (Weisbach 1988: 
435). A structure of this type enhances CEo power 
and authority and compromises board independence 
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(Finkelstein & d’Aveni 1994; Rhoades, Rechner & 
Sundaramurthy 2001), and eventually leads to the 
incapability of protecting the interest of shareholders 
by boards of directors. Therefore, CEo duality is 
expected to increase agency costs and affect firm 
performance negatively. 
There have been some dissenting views, with 
researchers finding that the combination of the 
positions (CEo and chairperson) enhanced company 
performance (Brickley, Coles & Jarrell 1997; Coles, 
McWilliams & Sen 2001; Ying-Fen 2005). 
While the empirical consensus around the 
relationship between CEo duality and corporate 
performance is not resolved, both theoretical arguments 
and regulatory frameworks provide strong support for 
the separation of these roles. Hence:
Hypothesis 2: Separation of the roles of the CEO and 
the chair of the board will be positively related to 
firm performance.
3.3 The Independence of Sub-committees
Board sub-committees are formed and used as another 
agency conflict–controlling mechanism by firms to 
organise their boards in such a way that they can 
make most effective use of their directors, with much 
of the key decision-making and implementation 
occurring at committee level (Kesner 1988; Bilimoria 
& Piderit 1994; daily 1994, 1996; Ellstrand et al. 
1999). It has been widely promulgated that boards of 
public companies should have separate monitoring 
committees for auditing the company financial 
statements, supervising the compensation of executive 
directors and controlling the selection process of new 
directors (lipman 2007; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
The audit committee is responsible for 
nominating the outside auditor; overseeing the 
preparation of the financial statements and annual 
reports; ensuring the efficacy of internal controls; 
and investigating allegations of material, financial, 
ethical and legal irregularities (Anderson & Anthony 
1986, cited in Ellstrand et al. 1999). The remuneration 
committee is responsible for establishing the level of 
compensation for senior corporate executives and 
corporate officers. In addition, the remuneration 
committee is charged with recommending appropriate 
compensation for corporate directors (Fisher 1986, 
cited in Ellstrand et al. 1999). Finally, the nomination 
committee is charged with the identification, selection 
and evaluation of qualified candidates to serve in key 
positions within the corporation. More specifically, 
this committee is responsible for the selection of the 
CEo, directors and other top corporate executives 
(Vance 1983).
The relationship between board monitoring 
sub-committees and company performance (corporate 
value) is a research area of corporate governance that 
has not been extensively studied (Gales & Kesner 
1994; dalton et al. 1998). Some early supportive 
empirical evidence is provided by Wild (1996) 
and laing and Weir (1999), who reported that a 
positive effect on firm performance resulted after 
the establishment of audit committees. According to 
Main and Johnston (1993), laing and Weir (1999) and 
Weir and laing (2000), the presence of remuneration 
committees is similarly positively associated with the 
improved performance of companies. Finally, Klein 
(1998) found a positive (though weak) relationship 
between the presence of a remuneration committee 
and company performance.
These committees perform key functions; their 
presence contributes to the board’s monitoring role and 
enhances the confidence of investors, not only in the 
reliability and fairness of company financial statements 
but also in the effectiveness of the corporate reward 
system (executive remuneration packages) and the 
quality of appointed directors.
A number of authors have argued that non-
executive or independent directors on board sub-
committees are more able to exercise independent 
judgement and will, therefore, be more effective 
in performing their monitoring role (Stapledon 
& lawrence 1997; laing & Weir 1999). Being 
independent of company executive positions, outside 
directors are free to assess and evaluate management 
actions and judgements objectively, as well as to make 
crucial business decisions based upon moral grounds 
(Vance 1983; Ellstrand et al. 1999). 
In the case of audit committees, independence 
will ensure that the financial viability and integrity 
of the company are maintained and the interests of 
shareholders are being properly safeguarded. Cotter 
and Silvester (2003) argue that ‘…independent audit 
committees, thereby, can reduce agency costs by 
minimizing the opportunistic selection of financial 
accounting policies, and by increasing the credibility 
and accuracy of financial reporting’ (p. 214). There is 
some empirical support for this position, with Weir, 
laing and McKnight (2002) reporting that uK firms 
with superior performance have a higher percentage 
of non-executives on the audit committee. Erickson 
et al. (2005) found a reduction in the negative impact 
of ownership concentration on the value of Canadian 
firms when the proportion of outside directors on the 
audit committee increased.
The call for independence may similarly be 
applied to remuneration committees, as put by laing 
& Weir (1999: 458):
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It is clearly important that the remuneration 
committee should be able to arrive at its decisions 
independently so that suitable reward packages are 
drawn up which would motivate and retain executive 
directors while protecting shareholder interests.
As stated by Weir and laing (2001: 88):
…given that the aim of the remuneration committee 
is to supervise the performance of the executive 
directors and to devise suitable reward packages, its 
effectiveness is likely to be related to its structure and 
membership. It would therefore be expected that the 
remuneration committee would be made up entirely 
of non-executive directors.
This view is perhaps more bluntly put by Williamson 
(1985: 313), who commented:
…the absence of an independent remuneration 
committee is akin to an executive’s writing their 
employment contract with one hand and then signing 
it with the other.
Finally, the independent structure of the 
nomination committee is also considered to be crucial. 
Ellstrand et al. (1999) asserted that ‘…a nominating 
committee that is composed of independent directors 
may be more likely to appoint other independent 
directors who will be vigilant in monitoring the 
CEo’. Support is provided by Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999), who found that there is significant 
negative market reaction and significantly lower 
cumulative abnormal stock returns when there is an 
involvement of the CEo in the selection of company 
directors.
In relation to monitoring committees (audit, 
remuneration and nomination), the independence 
of each committee member is expected to improve 
the ability both to monitor and discipline company 
management, in turn reducing agency costs and 
increasing company performance. Hence, the 
following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: The independence of the audit 
committee will be positively related to firm 
performance.
Hypothesis 3b: The independence of the 
remuneration committee will be positively related to 
firm performance.
Hypothesis 3c: The independence of the nomination 
committee will be positively related to firm 
performance.
3.4 director Shareholding
Central to agency theory is the belief that costs 
arising due to the separation between ownership 
(principal) and control (agent) can be reduced 
through the shareholdings of managers in their own 
firms. This leads to a ‘convergence of interest’, where 
the desired outcomes for owners and managers are 
aligned as a result of the capital returns accruing to 
the manager through their personal shareholding 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). If this holds, then executive 
shareholding should be associated with improved firm 
performance.
In contrast, independent directors fulfil a 
monitoring role to ensure that managers maximise 
shareholder wealth, rather than pursue their own ‘self-
interested’ behaviour (Fama & Jensen 1983). As noted 
by Cotter and Silvester (2003: 213):
…corporate boards generally include outside 
members who ratify decisions that involve serious 
agency problems between internal managers and 
residual claimants and act as arbiters in disagreements 
among internal managers.
This role is particularly important when managers, 
due to holding a significant investment in their own 
firm (through salary and shareholdings), act to protect 
their investment by making risk-averse decisions, 
which owners with a fully diversified portfolio would 
not choose (Jensen & Meckling 1976). To the extent 
that independent director shareholding reduces the 
ability of outside directors to act as independent 
arbiters, they should be associated with a decline in 
firm performance. Such suppositions lead to the final 
two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a: The shareholding of executive 
directors will be positively related to firm 
performance.
Hypothesis 4b: The shareholding of independent 
directors will be negatively related to firm 
performance.
4. ConTRol VARIABlES
A number of additional variables are included in the 
study to control for other potential influences on the 
performance of firms. 
4.1 Auditor Quality
An additional governance instrument through which 
shareholders can monitor managerial behaviour and 
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effectiveness is the independently audited annual 
report to shareholders, which includes an auditor’s 
review of the reliability of the financial statements 
prepared by management (Watts & Zimmerman 
1983). Auditors not only provide shareholders with 
independently ratified financial statements, but 
can also discover issues through internal control 
systems, including fraud detection. This improves the 
credibility of financial statements issued by the audited 
companies, leading to lower contracting costs with 
external suppliers and lenders and, therefore, a lower 
cost of capital (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
The quality of audit services may be defined as ‘the 
market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor 
will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting 
system; and (b) report the breach’ (deAngelo 1981: 
186). From a shareholder’s perspective, the quality 
of the audit is not observable and the shareholder is, 
therefore, able to make judgements based only on the 
reputation of the auditor and, possibly, price (where 
the fee is published). Given there is no direct measure 
of either audit quality or reputations, the majority of 
studies in this area have relied upon auditor size as a 
proxy measure for quality. 
Extant empirical research supports the positive 
relationship between auditor size and quality, 
indicating that the largest international audit firms 
provide above-average quality of audit services (e.g. 
Palmrose 1988; Siew Hong & Wong 1993; niemi 
2004). niemi (2004), in summarising the literature in 
this area, finds that large audit firms are associated with 
more accurate reports, lower litigation activity and 
greater compliance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) reporting requirements. They are 
also seen to be able to better withstand pressure from 
clients and, due to their greater collateral, are seen to 
have more to lose in the case of an audit failure. This 
latter point was similarly revealed by deAngelo (1981) 
who found that the probability of an auditor finding 
and reporting on a problem in the accounting system 
increased with audit firm size. Accordingly, auditor 
size as proxied by the participation of the ‘Big 4’ audit 
firms will be used as an indicator of higher-quality 
auditors, lowering agency and capital costs which will 
ultimately lead to better firm performance. 
4.2 Firm Size
The firm’s market capitalisation is included to control 
for the potential effects of firm size on corporate 
performance. Short and Keasey (1999) proposed two 
major avenues through which this effect may occur: 
firstly, a financing effect, in which larger firms find it 
easier to generate funds internally and to access funds 
from external sources, lowering the overall cost of 
capital; secondly, large firms may create higher entry 
barriers, thereby reducing competition and benefiting 
from above-normal profits.
 4.3 debt Ratio
The debt ratio is defined as the book value of total debt 
divided by total assets—and this influences company 
performance in two ways. Firstly, the presence of 
debt ensures that management decisions and the 
firm’s operation are being externally monitored by 
debt holders. Stiglitz (1985) contends that lenders, 
particularly banks, effectively perform a function of 
management supervision. Secondly, the use of financial 
leverage creates contractual obligations for managers to 
meet fixed future debt repayments, thereby reducing 
the funds available to management for discretionary 
consumption of perks; moreover, debt requires 
management to become more efficient to reduce both 
the probability of bankruptcy and the potential loss 
of their own reputation (Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Grossman & Hart 1982; Jensen 1986).
4.4 Industry Classification
Industry effects account for the nature of the 
competitive environment in which a firm operates, 
including the number and size-dispersion of industry 
rivals and the rate of growth of the industry in general. 
Since performance may also depend on industry 
affiliations, a number of studies have included a 
dummy variable to capture these industry effects 
(Vafeas & Theodorou 1998; Ellstrand et al. 1999).
4.5 Board Size 
The disadvantages associated with large boards have 
been addressed by many authors. ‘When boards get 
beyond seven or eight people, they are less likely to 
function effectively and are easier for the CEo to 
control’ (Jensen 1993: 865). A board with ‘eight or 
fewer members engenders greater focus, participation, 
and genuine interaction and debate’ (Firstenberg & 
Malkiel 1994: 34). According to Goodstein, Gautam 
and Boeker (1994), strategic actions and changes are less 
likely to be initiated when there are a large number of 
board members. Yermack (1996), who first empirically 
documented a significant inverse relation between 
board size and firm performance, concluded that the 
costs associated with large boards (e.g. coordination, 
communication and director free-riding costs) are not 
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sufficiently offset by its benefits alone. The present 
study includes consideration of the number of directors 
on the board both as a control variable and also as an 
attempt to expand the literature linking board size with 
corporate performance.
5. SAMPlE SElECTIon And RESEARCH 
dESIGn
To examine the relationship between governance and 
firm performance, 250 companies were randomly 
selected from a population of all companies listed in 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in the 2004/2005 
financial year. The year 2004/2005 was chosen as it 
was a period of heightened interest in governance and 
governance structures. This followed from the collapse 
of companies such as Enron and WorldCom. Indeed, 
the two years prior (2003 and 2004) were characterised 
by the high level of activity in governance reviews and 
legislative changes. A study conducted in the year 2005 
provided the first opportunity to assess governance 
and performance, incorporating mandatory changes in 
the areas of sub-committees, audit and composition. 
Finance-related companies including banking, 
insurance and trust companies were excluded from the 
sample, as their accounting reporting requirements and 
capital structure varies greatly from other companies 
and would distort the overall results. Missing data 
arises as a result of inadequate disclosure, resulting in 
an inability to distinguish the role of CEo and board 
chair; and through changes to company structures 
during the financial year that prevent the calculation 
of annualised returns to the shareholder (Table 1).
TABlE 1. Sample size for the governance–performance model
250 companies randomly selected from a population of all Australian companies listed on the ASX. Finance-
related companies including banking, insurance and trust companies were excluded from the sample. 
250
Companies for which an annual return to shareholder could not be calculated as a result of start-up, 
suspension, change of name or dissolution during the financial year.
(15)
Identities of CEos and/or chair of board not disclosed resulting in insufficient information to determine the 
company leadership structure (CEo duality).
(14)
Sample remaining after listwise deletion. 221
notes: In the corporate governance literature, the dependent variable firm performance has been measured as: market-based (de 
Miguel, Pindado & de la Torre 2004; Mura 2007); accounting-based (dhnadirek & Tang 2003; ng 2005); or both (Short & Keasey 
1999; Bonn 2004; Guedri & Hollandts 2008). For this study a comprehensive market measure—return to shareholder—is used, which 
captures both the capital (share price change) and dividend return to the owners. This is seen to have an advantage over accounting 
performance by incorporating a current perspective of the position of the firm (as determined by market price), rather than an 
historical perspective based on accounting results as measured by accounting conventions (demsetz & Villalonga 2001). 
Return to shareholder is regressed against seven variables related to board independence to measure their impact on firm performance. 
The study, therefore, specifically tests the following model: 
Return to Shareholder = a  + b 1ProInd + b 2duality + b 3AuditIndependence + b 4RemunIndependence + b 5nomIndependence + 
b
6ExecShareholding +b 7IndptShareholding + c  Control Variables
Where:
Return to Shareholder  = The annualised return to shareholders, including all price changes and reinvestment of dividends. It 
includes the effect of bonus issues and splits. 
ProInd = The proportion of independent directors on the board.
duality = 1 if the positions of CEo and chair of board are either held by the same person or persons with the same 
family name; and 0 otherwise. 
AuditIndependence = The proportion of independent directors in the audit committee. 
RemunIndependence = The proportion of independent directors in the remuneration committee. 
nomIndependence = The proportion of independent directors in the nomination committee. 
ExecShareholding  = The proportion of total shares held by the company’s executive directors. 
IndptShareholding = The proportion of total shares held by the company’s independent directors. 
Control Variables:
Auditorsize = 1 if the firm’s audit company is one of the following large audit firms: KPMG, E&Y, PWC and dTT; and 0 
otherwise.
Firmsize = The natural log of market capitalisation. 
debtratio = Total liabilities as a proportion of total assets.
Industry = 1 for companies in mining, energy and resource sectors; and 0 otherwise.
Boardsize = The number of directors on the board.
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6. RESulTS
Table 2  shows the mean return to shareholders for the 
2005 financial year (–5.90%), with a median of positive 
7.40%. Although this is indicative of a negatively 
skewed distribution, the test for skewness (–0.821) was 
acceptable and various data transformations failed to 
improve on this result. 
Table 3 (p. 10) displays the proportion of non-
executive and independent directors present on the 
full board and the audit, remuneration and nomination 
sub-committees. The presence of independent directors 
on the main board and sub-committees are identified 
by, firstly, isolating the non-executive directors which 
are required by ASX listing rules to be identified in the 
annual report. The independence of the non-executive 
directors is then verified by reviewing any ‘related 
party disclosures’ made in the annual report as required 
by Australian accounting standards, which requires the 
disclosure of any director-related transactions with the 
company. If the director has no connection with the 
company other than as a shareholder, they are treated 
as ‘independent’ in this study. 
of the 221 companies in the final sample, 
170 (77%) had established an audit committee; 130 
(59%), a remuneration committee; and 71 (32%), a 
nomination committee (Table 3, p. 10). Interestingly, 
the proportion of non-executive directors on all three 
sub-committees was similar at around 90%, as was the 
proportion of independent directors at around 68%, 
with the independent representation on the main 
board being much lower at 28%. As the objective of 
the study was to identify the performance impact of 
independence, a third measure was calculated (shown 
as ‘adjusted’ in Table 3). This measure assumes that 
when a company does not establish a sub-committee, 
the decision-making reverts to the full board; and, 
hence, the measure of independence applied is that 
appearing for the full board. This allows the full 
sample of 221 companies to be utilised as for each 
sub-committee, as the full board data are substituted 
where no sub-committee exists. As the full board 
representation of independent directors was generally 
lower than those on the sub-committees, it resulted in 
a lower mean value for the ‘adjusted’ sub-committee 
measure. 
The results from the ordinary least squares 
regression (Table 4, p. 11) find a significant positive 
relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and performance as measured by return 
to shareholders. A significant positive coefficient 
for the firm size variable is also consistent with 
the arguments discussed earlier; and for this data, 
mining and resource companies also outperform 
other sectors. A negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on independent shareholding suggests that, 
as hypothesised, ownership by outside directors may 
impact on company performance. The shareholdings 
of independent directors ranged from 0 to 66% of 
total shares with a mean of 2.04% (median 0.01%). It 
is interesting that these generally modest shareholdings 
appear to influence the director’s decision-making, and 
this points to the need for further research.
All other variables are insignificant, with no 
relationship detected with the other hypothesised 
variables of CEo duality and the independence of 
sub-committees.
7. ConCluSIon
The results of the study of influence of independent 
board monitoring on the level of firm performance 
were mixed. 
The proportion of independent directors on 
the full board was found to positively affect firm 
performance (Hypothesis 1) in line with the evidence 
on uS firms provided by Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990); on uK firms provided by Mura (2007); and 
on large Australian firms provided by Bonn (2004) 
and Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan (2004). This supports 
the contention that independent non-executives 
on the board enhance firm performance as they 
are able to actively scrutinise management action. 
The study further identified that mean independent 
representation on the board was 27.7%, with only 
3% of companies achieving a majority of independent 
directors, as opposed to 90% of companies with a 
majority of non-executive directors.
The measure of director ‘independence’ applied 
to committee representation is that the director 
has no connection with the company other than as 
TABlE 2. Mean, median and quartile range for percentage return to shareholders for the year 2005 (n = 221)
Min. Max. Mean Median
Percentiles
25th 75th 90th
–3.580 3.360 –0.059 0.074 –0.333 0.074 0.348
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a shareholder. directors’ shareholdings, however, 
are also investigated with respect to performance. 
The study found a negative relationship between 
performance and the shareholding of independent 
directors (Hypothesis 4b). It implies that the ability of 
outside directors to act as independent arbiters between 
managers and owners may be impacted by their 
own shareholding. It could be speculated that when 
otherwise independent directors hold a significant 
investment in their own firm (through salary and 
shareholdings), they act to protect their investment 
by making risk-averse decisions, which owners with 
a fully diversified portfolio would not find optimal 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976).
The positive, though insignificant finding for 
executive shareholding (Hypothesis 4a) is in line with 
the ‘convergence of interest’ hypothesis proposed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), where the desired 
outcomes for owner and manager are aligned as a 
result of the manager’s shareholding in the firm. Many 
prior studies, however, have found that this does 
not hold for larger shareholdings where managers 
become ‘entrenched’ and may prioritise their own 
rewards over shareholder returns (Singchawla, Evans 
& Evans 2011).
In contrast to the above, the leadership structure 
variable, which measures whether firms with a 
non-executive chair outperform firms that assign a 
CEo as board chair, was found to be insignificant 
(Hypothesis 2). Research in this area has produced 
numerous contradictory views, with some researchers 
finding that the combination of the positions enhanced 
company performance (Brickley, Coles & Jarrell 
1997; Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001; Ying-Fen 
2005); while others suggest that dividing these two 
positions enhances corporate performance (Rechner & 
dalton 1991; Pi & Timme 1993; daily & dalton 1994; 
Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy 2001). 
Board committee composition (Hypotheses 3a, 
3b, 3c) was similarly not statistically significant and 
negative. This result, however, mirrors the insignificant 
relationships generally discovered in previous studies 
into the influence of sub-committee independence on 
firm performance (Klein 1998; Vafeas & Theodorou 
1998; Ellstrand et al. 1999; Cotter & Silvester 2003; 
Hsu 2008). The data provide no evidence that 
regulatory pronouncements or shareholder agitation 
regarding the establishment and independence of 
board sub-committees are effective in enhancing firm 
performance.
For the control variables, large firms and those 
operating in the mining and resource sector were found 
to outperform others. Audit quality, board size and 
debt ratio were not found to have any influence on 
firm performance. 
Further research is required to identify the causes 
of this disparity between the theory and the practical 
outcomes noted above, before more costly regulation 
is enacted. This research could be extended upon in a 
number of ways. A replication of the study, employing 
TABlE 3. The proportion of non-executive (nEd) and independent directors on the full board and the audit, 
remuneration and nomination sub-committees
N Mean Median
Independent directors on full board 221 0.2771 0.3333
nEd on audit committee 170 0.9125 1.0000
Independent on audit committee 170 0.6780 0.6700
Independent on audit committee adjusted 221 0.5624 0.6000
nEd on remuneration committee 130 0.9099 1.0000
Independent on remuneration committee 130 0.6847 0.6700
Independent on remuneration committee adjusted 221 0.4930 0.5000
nEd on nomination committee 71 0.8703 1.0000
Independent on nomination committee 71 0.6973 0.6700
Independent on nomination committee adjusted 221 0.3889 0.3333
note: The ‘adjusted’ rows measure assumes that when a company does not establish a sub-committee, the decision-making reverts to 
the full board; and, hence, the measure of independence applied is that appearing for the full board.
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longitudinal data, would assist in determining whether 
the relationships found were robust under differing 
economic conditions. Return to shareholder was 
employed as the dependent variable in this analysis, 
to provide an assessment of the efficiency with which 
management is utilising assets. Future research could 
assess the impact of the governance mechanisms 
on other performance-related variables, including 
accounting-based measures (RoA, RoE and RoI) 
which provide an historical view of performance based 
on accounting conventions. It would also be possible to 
control for potential endogeneity in the variables (i.e. 
performance influencing changes in board structure); 
although Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) find this does not 
significantly change their results when tested using 
two-stage least squares regression.
TABlE 4. Regression analysis of return to shareholder on committee independence, director shareholding, debt ratio, 




B Std Error Tolerance VIF
(Constant) –1.454 0.335 –4.336 0.000
ProInd 1.451 0.665 2.181 0.030* 0.297 3.362
duality 0.006 0.150 0.041 0.968 0.852 1.174
AuditIndependence –0.369 0.280 –1.320 0.188 0.282 3.550
RemunIndependence 0.206 0.287 0.718 0.474 0.306 3.266
nomIndependence –0.407 0.347 –1.173 0.242 0.277 3.607
Auditorsize –0.029 0.131 –0.220 0.826 0.713 1.403
IndptShareholding –1.802 0.877 –2.056  0.041* 0.824 1.214
ExecShareholding 0.370 0.350 1.058 0.291 0.759 1.317
debtratio –0.053 0.160 –0.328 0.743 0.837 1.194
Industry 0.290 0.128 2.267 0.024* 0.731 1.367
Firmsize 0.112 0.042 2.665 0.008** 0.364 2.750





**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Where: 
Return to Shareholder  = The annualised return to shareholders, including all price changes and reinvestment of dividends. It 
includes the effect of bonus issues and splits.
ProInd = The proportion of independent directors on the board.
duality  = 1 if the positions of CEo and chair of board are either held by the same person or persons with the same 
family name; and 0 otherwise. 
AuditIndependence = The proportion of non-executive directors in the audit committee. 
RemunIndependence = The proportion of non-executive directors in the remuneration committee. 
nomIndependence = The proportion of non-executive directors in the nomination committee. 
Auditorsize = 1 if the firm’s audit company is one of the following large audit firms: KPMG, E&Y, PWC and dTT, and 0 
otherwise.
IndptShareholding  = The proportion of total shares held by the company’s independent directors. 
ExecShareholding  = The proportion of total shares held by the company’s executive directors.   
debtratio = Total liabilities as a proportion of total assets.
Industry = 1 for companies in mining and resource sectors; and 0 otherwise.
Firmsize = The natural log of market capitalisation. 
Boardsize = The number of directors on the board.
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The possibility of using more refined measures to 
assess the characteristics of the board and its committee 
members, including their experience and expertise, 
would enhance our understanding of the role of the 
committees and their ultimate impact on performance. 
This may include qualitative aspects which investigate 
the management process and directly interrogate the 
participants (e.g. how influential are non-executive 
directors in the decision-making process?), rather than 
relying on reported board structures.
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